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by Richard D. Gritta, Bahram Adrangi, Brian Adams, and Nina Tatyanina 
Stricken	by	the	events	of	Sept.	11,	2001,	and	by	increases	in	fuel	prices,	a	key	cost	which	has	spiked	
upward	as	the	price	of	oil	has	risen	to	more	than	$130	per	barrel,	the	airlines	find	themselves,	once	
again,	in	fragile	financial	shape.		The	purpose	of	this	article	is	to	measure	the	financial	condition	of	
the	industry,	given	this	situation,	using	a	popular	financial	stress	model,	the	Altman	Model.		
INTRODUCTION
The U.S airline industry has been stricken by the events of the new millennium. First traffic was 
severely hurt by the events of Sept. 11, 2001, and after traffic growth had finally resumed, the war 
in Iraq contributed to the price of a barrel of oil soaring to nearly $100 per bbl. in late 2007 and to 
more than $130 in May of 2008.  These events as well as the labor unrest present in the industry have 
financially affected all the carriers, causing a spate of bankruptcy filings.
The purpose of the paper is to assess the current financial condition of the major U.S. air 
carriers and to compare their financial strength to the 1995-1999 period when the carriers earned 
record profits.  The methodology employed will be the Z” Score Model, a variant of the Altman Z 
Score Model, perhaps the most popular approach to tracking financial health and the potential for 
insolvency.  
METHODOLOGY
In the past, several of the authors of this paper have tracked air carrier financial condition and 
forecasted financial stress and insolvency using the standard Altman Z Score Model (Altman 1968) 
which is widely known and used for many industries.  The model weights key ratios that are used 
by financial analysts to gauge the liquidity, leverage (debt burdens), turnover (or efficiency), and 
profitability of the companies. The Z Score model takes the form:
(1)   Z= 1.2X1 + 1.4X2 + 3.3X3 + .6X4 + 1.0X5
Where X1 – X5 are ratios that measured each of the aspects of financial strength. 
X1 = net working capital to total assets (a liquidity ratio)
X2 = retained earnings to total assets (a profitability ratio)
X
3
 = operating profit to total assets (a profitability ratio)
X4 = market value of equity to book value of debt (a leverage ratio)
X5 = operating revenues to total assets (an efficiency ratio)
The coefficients in the equations were the results of a stepwise multiple discriminant analysis 
or MDA regression. High ratios increase the Z Score and thus lessen the danger of failure, and vice 
versa. These ratios were weighted by the intercept terms to produce the Z Score. Altman (1968) 
found that the critical values of the Z were 1.81 and 2.99.  Firms with scores of <1.81 fit a bankruptcy 
profile, while firms with scores>2.99 fit the solvency profile.  Scores between the two values lie in 
what Altman (1968) called the “gray zone” where profiling is more difficult.  If the analyst wanted 
one key score in place of the “gray zone,” he argued for a 2.67 cutoff because that zone contained 
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both failed and non-failed firms. The barrier of 2.67 minimized the misclassifications. The model’s 
overall success rate in forecasting firms that ultimately failed was 76%. 
The Altman model has been used in air transport to successfully predict carrier failures as early 
as the 1980s where it correctly presaged the bankruptcy filings of both Braniff and Continental (Gritta 
1982), and in subsequent years to track airline financial performance. Because of the significant 
increase in the use of leasing to finance assets in this industry, that model has become less reliable 
over time (Gritta et al. 1995).  The use of off-the-balance-sheet leverage via operating leases can 
overstate the X5 variable in the model by understating the assets that produce the revenues. The 
revenues generated by these “hidden” assets appear on the income statement but the assets are 
not recorded on the balance sheet.  In addition, Altman (1983) has suggested the use of a slightly 
different model, the Z”, when assessing the financial condition of service type firms.  For these 
reasons, the authors use the latter model in this paper.  It takes the form:
(2)   Z = 6.56X1 +3.26X2 + 6.72X3+ 1.05X4
This model utilizes four input variables; X1 –X4 as defined above and the same MDA regression 
procedure to estimate the intercept terms in the equation. 
A Z” Score of 1.1 or less indicates a high degree of financial stress, and thus an increase in the 
probability of bankruptcy in the near future.  A Z” Score of 2.6 or above indicates a high probability 
that bankruptcy will not occur, while a Z” Score between these two numbers indicates that there 
is insufficient statistical significance to make a prediction.  As is the case with the Z Score Model, 
Altman (1968) originally referred to scores in this range as the “gray zone.” In this range lie some 
firms that have failed and some that have remained solvent. It should be noted that the model can 
also be used to assess overall relative financial strength for comparative purposes.
Table 1 shows Z” Scores for the major carriers for the years 1997-2006. Included in the table 
are all the passenger carriers now classed as majors under the DOT classification ($1.0 billion of 
revenues).
Table 1: Air Carrier Z” Scores, 1997-2006
CARRIRER 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Airtran -5.92 -2.01 -1.19 -3.38 -1.89 -1.58 2.10 2.01 1.04 0.34
Alaska 0.77 1.67 1.51 1.29 1.14 0.77 0.88 1.03 0.42 0.10
American 1.03 1.69 1.51 0.75 0.44 -1.74 -1.21 -1.31 -1.56 -1.34
American Eagle 1.72 0.90 0.08 -1.67 -1.59 -0.75 -0.57 -0.41 -0.29
ATA -0.74 1.24 0.79 -0.91 -0.72 -2.33 -1.56 -38.70 -110 -24.11
Americawest 0.90 1.69 2.82 1.84 -0.93 -1.13 0.22 -1.16 -1.29 -2.22
Atlantic SE 4.20 5.49 7.35 7.93 .272 1.67 1.46 -1.65 -0.53
Comair 2.90 1.88 -4.56 0.06 -1.44
Continental 0.36 0.97 0.68 0.78 -0.27 -0.68 0.08 -0.68 -0.48 -0.41
Delta 1.02 1.17 1.43 0.72 -0.41 -1.21 -1.03 -2.38 -4.28 -5.94
Express Jet 1.46 1.91 3.15
Jet Blue 0.00 0.10 0.94 1.95 0.74 0.18 0.26
Northwest 1.40 -0.18 0.52 0.61 0.29 -0.49 0.49 -0.31 -1.10 -1.85
Southwest 2.84 3.15 3.00 3.10 2.78 3.11 3.25 2.60 2.80 2.85
United -0.05 -0.22 0.39 0.08 -1.62 -2.48 -3.34 -4.02 -13.3 5.39
Source: Calculated from raw data contained in Air Carrier Financial Statistics Quarterly, 
 various issues.
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One significant factor stands out from the table. Of the 15 carriers listed, most have had a score 
in the danger zone for most of the years since 1997. In fact six (ATA, American West, Continental, 
Delta, Northwest and United) have filed under the Bankruptcy Act and an additional carrier, American, 
has threatened to do so since 2000.  Only Southwest stands out as a beacon in a sea of red ink and 
financial stress over the entire study horizon, although several carriers have had stronger scores for 
some years in the 10 years of the study.  These include AirTran, Alaska, Atlantic South East, Comair, 
and Express Jet. Although FedEx was not included in the table, its performance mirrors Southwest 
with Z” Scores that are quite good (consistently above 2.00 for the entire period).1 
Negative numbers indicate severe financial distress, the result of negative X variables in the 
equations for these carriers (that is, negative profitability, negative net working capital, etc.). A 
major factor in the calculation of the Z’’ scores is the X4 variable, the Equity to Debt (Leverage) 
ratio.  Table 2 lists the leverage ratios for the major air carriers used to calculate the Z’’ scores. 
Negative numbers results from negative equity. With the exception of Comair, the carriers that used 
less leverage (higher equity/debt ratios) had the highest average Z’’ score over the past decade.  This 
provides further evidence that the carriers that relied less on leverage were in better financial health. 
A potentially worse signal of the health of the major carriers is that over the six-year period from 
1997 to 2003 only an average of two major carriers a year had negative equity (negative equity/debt 
ratios, the result of debt exceeding equity), but that number increased to almost six per year from 
2004 to 2006.
Table 2: Carrier Equity to Debt Ratios, 1997-2006
CARRIRER 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Airtran .17 -.08 .01 -.04 -.02 .14 .58 .44 .31
Alaska .46 .55 .51 .41 .34 .25 .29 .29 .22 .22
American .43 .50 .49 .38 .30 .07 .01 .00 -.04 -.04
American Eagle .37 .25 .10 .02 .00 .03 .04 .04 .06
ATA .01 .09 .14 .10 .02 -.15 -.14 -.70 -.94 .24
Americawest .79 .93 1.13 .98 .61 .22 .24 .20 -.05 -.06
Atlantic SE .88 1.23 1.30 5.21 2.26 1.00 .71 .24 .33 .37
Comair 2.18 1.30 .39 .36 .20
Continental .20 .22 .31 .25 .31 .22 .23 .16 .15 .04
Delta .51 .65 .60 .63 .42 .20 .10 -.06 -.32 -.41
Express Jet -.25 -.09 .04 .21 .56 -.35 .00 -.16 -.20 -.06
Jet Blue .50 .36 .43 .44 .37 .31 .24
Northwest .70 .47 .53 .56 .37 .17 .23 .15 .01 -.11
Southwest .90 1.11 1.07 1.11 .80 .97 1.04 .98 1.10 1.14
United .20 .24 .35 .29 .15 -.03 -.17 -.24 -.54 .10
US Air .15 .24 .24 .19 -.03 -.24 .01 -.06 -.03 .04
Source:  Calculated from raw data contained in Air Carrier Financial Statistics Quarterly, various   
 issues
Note that leverage became more attractive during this period.  Interest rates on Baa bonds, 
according to data from the Federal Reserve (www.stlouisfed.org), were fairly constant from January 
1997 (8.09%) through December 2000 (8.02%).  Then rates dropped more than 300 basis points 
from a high of 8.90% in May of 2000 to 5.82% in February of 2005.  This dramatic decline in the 
cost of borrowing created an incentive for carriers to increase their use of leverage during the first 
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half of this decade.  Figure 1 shows the trend of the equity/debt ratios for the major carriers from 
1997 through 2006.
If these firms increased debt levels during this period and were able to maintain equity values 
then equity/debt ratios would decline.  However, not to the degree that is shown in the graph above. 
A carrier doubling its debt levels would halve its equity/debt ratio, but a majority of these carriers 
experience a greater decline than 50% in their equity/debt ratio over the decade.  Additionally, the 
fact that only three of the nine carriers listed were able to maintain a double-digit equity/debt ratio 
shows that equity values were declining while debt levels were increasing.2 
CONCLUSION
The financial health of the major U.S. air carriers has worsened throughout the first decade of the 
21st century.  With the exception of Southwest, carriers experienced a decline in their financial health 
as measured by the Altman Z’’ Score Model.  A key factor in this trend has been the combination 
of decreasing equity values and increasing use of debt.  Some of this trend can be explained by the 
drop in interest rates from 2000 to 2005, which increases the attractiveness of debt as a source of 
capital.  However, the industries reliance on debt could have a significant negative impact on the 
major carriers if interest rates rise again in the next several years.
Endnotes
1. Note that scores below the 1.1 barrier don’t always presage immediate failure.  There are several 
reasons for this.  In some cases, lenders continue to renegotiate terms of debt rather than see the 
carrier face liquidation. In addition, many of these carriers face weakened competition (other 
carriers with low scores) and still continue to compete because of the weakness of the opponent 
in the battle for market share. The overall low scores in this industry, however, is clear proof of 
the fragile condition of the vast majority of the airlines.
Figure 1: Trend of Equity / Debt Ratios, 1997-2006
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2. The tremendous volatility in this industry is due to two key factors. The first is the tremendous 
operating leverage present in all the carriers. This stems from the presence of a significant 
amount of fixed costs the carriers face. The second is the financial over-leverage taken on by 
management.  These two factors interact in a multiplicative way to create wide swings in profits. 
For a complete discussion of this issue, see Gritta et al. (2005) and Gritta et al. (2006).
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